WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, along with Ron Wyden (D-OR), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Angus King (I-ME), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Jon Ossoff (D-GA), and Mark Kelly (D-AZ), wrote to White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles about the risks to our national security of allowing unvetted DOGE staff and representatives to access classified and sensitive government materials. The Committee members demanded that the administration provide details to Congress about how DOGE staff and representatives are being vetted, which systems, records and information are being shared, and what steps the administration is taking to safeguard them from misuse or disclosure.

“According to press reports, DOGE inspectors already have gained access to classified materials, including intelligence reports, at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), sensitive government payment systems, including for Social Security and Medicare, at the Treasury Department, and federal personnel data from the Office of Personnel Management. Further, as of today the scope of DOGE’s access only seems to be expanding, as reports indicate DOGE has now entered the Department of Labor and other agencies,” the senators wrote. “No information has been provided to Congress or the public as to who has been formally hired under DOGE, under what authority or regulations DOGE is operating, or how DOGE is vetting and monitoring its staff and representatives before providing them seemingly unfettered access to classified materials and Americans’ personal information.”

The senators added, “As you know, information is classified to protect the national security interests of the United States. Government employees and contractors only receive access to such information after they have undergone a rigorous background investigation and demonstrated a ‘need to know.’ Circumventing these requirements creates enormous counterintelligence and security risks. For example, improper access to facilities and systems containing security clearance files of Intelligence Community personnel puts at risk the safety of the men and women who serve this country. In addition, unauthorized access to classified information risks exposure of our operations and potentially compromises not only our own sources and methods, but also those of our allies and partners. If our sources, allies, and partners stop sharing intelligence because they cannot trust us to protect it, we will all be less safe.”

The senators also raised alarms about the privacy implications of allowing an unknown number of DOGE staff to access unclassified systems containing information about individual American taxpayers and organizations. 

Wrote the senators, “Unclassified government systems also contain sensitive data, the unintended disclosure of which could result in significant harm to individuals or organizations, including financial loss, identity theft, and exposure of medical and other private personal information. The U.S. Treasury payment systems, in particular, are used to disburse trillions of dollars each year, and contain everyday Americans’ personal information, such as Social Security numbers, home addresses, and bank accounts. Allowing DOGE access to this information raises unprecedented risks to Americans’ private personal and financial information.”

Finally, the senators also noted that there are strict cybersecurity controls in place for federal networks which DOGE does not seem to be following, including by reportedly connecting personal devices to sensitive government systems.

“Such unregulated practices with our government’s most sensitive networks render Americans’ personal and financial information, and our classified national secrets, vulnerable to ransomware and cyber-attacks by criminals and foreign adversaries. The recent unprecedented Salt Typhoon and Change Healthcare attacks that affected tens of millions of Americans further underscore the importance of rigorously fortifying our government systems,” the letter says. 

The full text of the letter is available here and below. 

Dear Ms. Wiles,

We write to express our grave concern with the illegal actions currently being undertaken by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), which risk exposure of classified and other sensitive information that jeopardizes national security and violates Americans’ privacy. The January 20 Executive Order establishes DOGE under the Executive Office of the President with DOGE Teams established by Agency Heads within their respective agencies, and requires the Administrator of DOGE to report to the White House Chief of Staff. According to press reports, DOGE inspectors already have gained access to classified materials, including intelligence reports, at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), sensitive government payment systems, including for Social Security and Medicare, at the Treasury Department, and federal personnel data from the Office of Personnel Management. Further, as of today the scope of DOGE’s access only seems to be expanding, as reports indicate DOGE has now entered the Department of Labor and other agencies.

No information has been provided to Congress or the public as to who has been formally hired under DOGE, under what authority or regulations DOGE is operating, or how DOGE is vetting and monitoring its staff and representatives before providing them seemingly unfettered access to classified materials and Americans’ personal information.

As you know, information is classified to protect the national security interests of the United States. Government employees and contractors only receive access to such information after they have undergone a rigorous background investigation and demonstrated a “need to know.”  Circumventing these requirements creates enormous counterintelligence and security risks. For example, improper access to facilities and systems containing security clearance files of Intelligence Community personnel puts at risk the safety of the men and women who serve this country. In addition, unauthorized access to classified information risks exposure of our operations and potentially compromises not only our own sources and methods, but also those of our allies and partners. If our sources, allies, and partners stop sharing intelligence because they cannot trust us to protect it, we will all be less safe.

Unclassified government systems also contain sensitive data, the unintended disclosure of which could result in significant harm to individuals or organizations, including financial loss, identity theft, and exposure of medical and other private personal information. The U.S. Treasury payment systems, in particular, are used to disburse trillions of dollars each year, and contain everyday Americans’ personal information, such as Social Security numbers, home addresses, and bank accounts. Allowing DOGE access to this information raises unprecedented risks to Americans’ private personal and financial information.

Moreover, there are strict cybersecurity controls for accessing federal networks, which DOGE does not seem to be following, including by reportedly connecting personal devices to sensitive government systems. Such unregulated practices with our government’s most sensitive networks render Americans’ personal and financial information, and our classified national secrets, vulnerable to ransomware and cyber-attacks by criminals and foreign adversaries. The recent unprecedented Salt Typhoon and Change Healthcare attacks that affected tens of millions of Americans further underscore the importance of rigorously fortifying our government systems.

The Executive Branch cannot operate without regard to rules, regulations, or Congressional oversight. The American people, and our intelligence officials, deserve to know that their information is being appropriately safeguarded. We therefore respectfully request written responses to the following questions by February 14, 2025:

1. Provide a list of personnel operating under DOGE, their position or role, and their duties. 
2. Pursuant to the Executive Order, DOGE teams are to be established by Agency Heads within their respective agencies. Provide a list of each agency that has established a DOGE team, and the agency personnel overseeing such team.
3. Under what authorities is DOGE conducting its operations?
4. Who is overseeing DOGE’s operations? 
5. Provide a list of each agency DOGE has requested information from.
6. Provide a list of all unclassified systems, records, or other information DOGE has requested and/or gained access to. 
7. Provide a list of all classified systems, records, or other information DOGE has requested and/or gained access to.
8. Do DOGE staff or representatives have access to any Intelligence Community systems, networks, or other information? If so, please specify the extent of such access.
9. Under what authority is DOGE requesting and/or gaining access to classified information?
10. What security clearances have been provided to DOGE staff or representatives, and who has authorized such clearances?
11. What processes have been followed prior to granting security clearances to DOGE staff or representatives?
12. What vetting for potential conflicts of interest has been conducted prior to granting clearances or access to government systems, records, or other information to DOGE staff or representatives?
13. Provide a list of each DOGE staff or representative who has requested and/or gained access to classified information, what clearance each such individual holds, and who authorized each security clearance. 
14. Who is supervising and/or monitoring DOGE employee access to classified information?
15. What processes have been followed prior to granting DOGE staff or representatives access to sensitive government systems and networks, and who has authorized such access?
16. Who is supervising and/or monitoring DOGE employee access to sensitive government systems and networks?
17. Has DOGE briefed you, the White House Chief of Staff, on the counterintelligence and other risks of DOGE staff or representatives accessing classified and other sensitive information? If so, please specify the date of the briefing and those in attendance.
18. Has DOGE briefed you, the White House Chief of Staff, on the counterintelligence and other risks of DOGE staff or representatives accessing government networks and systems? If so, please specify the date of the briefing and those in attendance.
19. Has the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and/or the Central Intelligence Agency been briefed on the counterintelligence and other risks of DOGE staff or representatives accessing Treasury’s payment systems? If so, please specify the date of the briefing and those in attendance.  
20. Has the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and/or the Central Intelligence Agency been briefed on the counterintelligence and other risks of DOGE staff or representatives accessing USAID’s classified and other sensitive information, including security clearance files? If so, please specify the date of the briefing and those in attendance.
21. What actions if any has the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and/or the Central Intelligence Agency taken to ensure DOGE employee access does not create counterintelligence risks?
22. What actions if any has the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and/or the Central Intelligence Agency taken to ensure DOGE employee access does not compromise classified or other sensitive intelligence and/or personal information of intelligence community officials?  

To underscore, DOGE seems to have unimpeded access to some of our nation’s most sensitive information, including classified materials and the private personal and financial information of everyday Americans. In light of such unprecedented risks to our national and economic security, we expect your immediate attention and prompt response.

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