Senator Warner submitted this testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee today as top Pentagon officials prepared to testify about last month’s announcement of plans to close-down U.S. Joint Forces Command in Hampton Roads. Senator Warner has been working with other members of the Virginia delegation to marshal arguments against the decision. 

In the photo above, Senator Warner speaks to Patrick Terpstra of Hampton Roads' WVEC-TV about the Pentagon meeting.

Written Testimony Before The

SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Regarding "Defense Department Budget Initiatives"

 Mister Chairman, I first want to thank the Committee for an opportunity to provide this testimony.

I would like to open my comments with a quote from General Jim Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, in testimony before this very Committee just six months ago on the critical functions provided by U.S. Joint Forces Command:

“We are engaged in training and deploying forces, analyzing and applying lessons learned, and overseeing the development of joint capabilities in response to our warfighting Commanders’ needs.  These activities demand a sense of urgency.”

[Testimony of General James N. Mattis, Commander, United States Joint Forces Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2010]

Since Secretary Gates recently announced that JFCOM is, in his view, no longer needed, I would suggest that the Department of Defense has lacked its own sense of urgency in letting the Congress, the elected leadership in Virginia and our active military and their families know what rationale drove his decision.  

We are all still guessing.

Lack of Transparency

Since the Secretary of Defense announced his recommendation to close Joint Forces Command In August as part of a series of initiatives designed to gain efficiencies in the Department of Defense, I have been troubled by the lack of transparency associated with these actions. 

We have yet to receive a detailed analysis relating to the closure recommendation despite numerous requests for this information.  While I commend DoD’s efforts to reduce overhead and to apply savings to force structure and modernization, the failure to consult more fully with Congress in a transparent way works against the Department’s ultimate goal of becoming more cost-conscious and efficient in providing for our nation’s defense.

DoD will have excellent opportunities this week to begin to address our many concerns about the lack of transparency so far, and the unwillingness or inability to answer even the most basic questions.  And I strongly encourage the Department to participate in this discussion in a more significant and meaningful manner than we have seen to date.   

In the nearly seven weeks since the JFCOM announcement, the Virginia delegation has collectively sent multiple requests seeking answers to a variety of important questions, but our sustained efforts have been for naught.  One can only conclude that there is no comprehensive analysis to support the recommendation to close JFCOM.  The present lack of transparency and consultation stand in stark contrast to how decisions of this magnitude typically are made.

I recently met with General Stephane Abrial, Commander of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and he disclosed that neither he nor his NATO leadership were consulted on this decision despite his Command’s daily interactions with JFCOM and the U.S. military.  Our Allies and partners deserve better. 

Stonewalling Congress and the Commonwealth

I am especially concerned that the Department has yet to brief members of our congressional delegation, Governor McDonnell, or any local or community officials about the potential impacts that this closure decision, and the reduction in contract support, could have on the Commonwealth and our nation’s military readiness as a whole. As a result, we have no information that would allow us to quantify the possible effects of this proposal, including its fiscal and local economic implications. 

Throughout U.S. history, the Commonwealth and our Hampton Roads region have been strong supporters of the military and its families. Every day officials in our communities interact on a multitude of decisions to coordinate actions relating to military facilities and related contract work. 

We are perplexed why the process guiding DoD’s proposal to disestablish this major unified combatant command is being conducted in such complete contrast with DoD’s traditional approach to such matters.  

Impacting readiness

As a Senator, I also am concerned about the impact that JFCOM’s disestablishment will have on the military’s joint training, operations, concept development and experimentation.  JFCOM serves as a forceful advocate for our warfighters’ joint capabilities, a function of growing importance as our military operates in conjunction with coalition forces around the world. 

JFCOM is the only command that focuses on emerging threats and capabilities, and works to solve interoperability problems.  This is an area where we clearly have room to improve, and General Mattis agreed in his March testimony that the journey in not complete, “Presently, the joint force is not optimally trained and organized to advise and assist with building partnerships.” 

As we learned from painful experience during the 1980s and early 1990s, joint readiness and interoperability are perishable qualities.  JFCOM’s performance of joint force and coalition training over the past 10 years has led to significant improvements in the ability of all branches of our armed forces to deploy together more effectively for joint operations.  General Mattis notes with pride that in the past year JFCOM, “responded to more than 390 rotational and emergent requests for forces from combatant commanders resulting in the sourcing of more than 398,000 personnel supporting numerous global missions.”

Service “stovepipes” are not the answer

Beyond the negative impact JFCOM’s closure would have on our ability to operate jointly during combat operations, its elimination will risk falling back into DoD’s traditional “stovepipe” approach to force structure planning and acquisition.  The acquisition process yearns for an independent voice and detailed, independent testing of front-line systems has always been essential. Who will do the unbiased, independent testing? Who will determine the interoperability standards? Who will fight for spending the extra money to make sure systems are ready for the joint battlefield?

Disestablishing JFCOM is the equivalent of abandoning a decades-long effort, initiated and supported by multiple Secretaries of Defense and chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the maximum operational effectiveness of our armed forces.  The ongoing turnover of personnel requires a continuous joint training program; the development of new systems and equipment requires continuous oversight to ensure joint interoperability; and emerging global challenges and threats require continuous development, testing, and implementation of new joint doctrine and tactics. 

The vital nature of JFCOM’s joint force training functions mandates that we preserve them even if an eventual decision is made to disestablish JFCOM.  As such, I remain concerned about the relocation of these functions and the cost it will take to perform them elsewhere.  How will this save money?  The Department has yet to provide any analytical data to document projected savings that would result from the transfer of this essential responsibility to another entity.  

In addition, the Department has yet to explain how this decision will affect JFCOM’s relationships with NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the numerous agreements and commitments we have made to assist NATO partner nations in their ongoing efforts to transform their militaries. As General Mattis noted in March, “Joint Forces Command routinely collaborates bi-laterally with representatives from 48 nations.  These relationships are critical to building the trust and interoperability necessary to build and sustain strong alliances and coalitions.”

Show us the business case

I have also asked DoD for a cost-benefit analysis or other analytics that show what savings would be gained by closing JFCOM in its other principal mission areas, and how such estimated savings might outweigh the elimination of the missions that JFCOM currently performs and the capabilities it helps to develop.   

What is the business case for this decision?  Since DoD’s August announcement, a fundamental question remains unanswered: Who will perform these vital roles and missions if JFCOM is disestablished? Specifically:

• Who in the unified command plan will oversee experimentation, and the future force?
• Who’s thinking about the future? Technology starts today are the leading edge of the weapons systems that we will rely on in 15-20 years.
• What is the rationale to remove the one, independent voice from the acquisition process? Who will be the force to compel jointness?  
• How will this decision save money—is this simply reshuffling the chess board? 

 A cooperative solution

During Secretary Gates’ news conference in August, he said he would seek ideas, suggestions, and proposals from outside normal official channels.  So far, that apparently has not happened, and I urge the Secretary to allow Congress the opportunity to review the Department’s cost assessments, business case, and recommended courses of action prior to any decisions on JFCOM’s fate or any reductions in its service-support contracts.  We have assembled a group of experts who are available to help the Pentagon conduct this analysis. 

In conclusion, Mister Chairman, I remain committed to open and honest discussions with the Department of Defense concerning any of these important issues. I also want to reiterate that it is my sincere hope that the Department of Defense will give the Virginia delegation a chance to provide our input and recommendations as they develop proposed courses of action for the future of the command.

Thank you.