Press Releases

Sen. Warner Raises Concerns About Security Clearances for Top Navy Intel Officials

Reports indicate senior Naval officers in key intel and cybersecurity positions have had access to classified material suspended for more than 2 years

Jan 28 2016

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, wrote to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus today to raise concerns about the security clearance status of two of the Navy’s top intelligence personnel. The letter follows recent reports that two senior Naval officers—Vice Admiral Ted “Twig” Branch and Rear Admiral Bruce Loveless—continue to occupy key leadership positions overseeing the Navy’s intelligence and cybersecurity operations despite their clearances being revoked in November 2013, pending resolution of a Department of Justice investigation.

“I do not question the admirals’ character or make any judgment about their dedication to serving our nation, but I am concerned about the extremely unusual circumstance of having uncleared people in key roles within the intelligence community for an inordinately lengthy time period. I am concerned about the impact that the admirals’ continued presence in these roles while lacking a clearance might have on the Navy’s operational effectiveness,” wrote Sen. Warner. “Moreover, I see this issue as inconsistent with broader intelligence community practices that require rank-and-file intelligence officers to maintain security clearances in order to continue performing their jobs. Vice Admiral Branch’s continued role as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, which oversees the Navy Information Dominance Forces based in Suffolk, Virginia, makes this matter of particular interest to me and my constituents.”

January 28, 2016

 

The Honorable Ray Mabus

Secretary of the Navy

The Pentagon

Room 4E686

Washington, DC 20350

 

Dear Secretary Mabus:

I am writing to inquire about recent reports that two senior Naval officers—Vice Admiral Ted “Twig” Branch and Rear Admiral Bruce Loveless—continue to occupy key leadership positions overseeing the Navy’s intelligence and cybersecurity operations despite their clearances being revoked.  I do not question the admirals’ character or make any judgment about their dedication to serving our nation, but I am concerned about the extremely unusual circumstance of having uncleared people in key roles within the intelligence community for an inordinately lengthy time period.

I am concerned about the impact that the admirals’ continued presence in these roles while lacking a clearance might have on the Navy’s operational effectiveness.  Moreover, I see this issue as inconsistent with broader intelligence community practices that require rank-and-file intelligence officers to maintain security clearances in order to continue performing their jobs. Vice Admiral Branch’s continued role as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, which oversees the Navy Information Dominance Forces based in Suffolk, Virginia, makes this matter of particular interest to me and my constituents.

I am interested to know what, if any, actions the Navy has taken or intends to take to address these concerns.  Specifically, I am interested in the following:

  • How did the Navy make the decision to keep these two officers in place for two years while they lacked security clearances? What steps has the Navy taken to rectify this unusual situation, and what barriers have you faced in addressing this? Why did it take until September 2015 to submit an official nominee for Vice Admiral Branch’s replacement?
  • Keeping these uncleared admirals in place appears to apply a different standard than would be afforded to a rank-and-file employee of Naval Intelligence.  If that is not the case, please explain.  If it is, why were these two officers afforded different treatment?
  • In what way has Vice Admiral Branch’s and Rear Admiral Loveless’ lack of clearance restricted their job duties?  How have those duties been reassigned? Do you believe that these officers can adequately assess the effectiveness of their units without being able to see the full body of work produced by the organizations they oversee, and if so, how?
  • Has the Navy identified any negative impacts on our naval intelligence and cybersecurity activities as a result of this arrangement? If so, what steps in the Navy taking to mitigate those impacts?

Thank you for your attention to this matter, and I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

 

Mark R. Warner

United States Senator